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Executive Director
uring the 1980s, field 
experiments were conducted in four states 
to evaluate the potential of using cash 
bonus offers to induce early return to 
work by unemployment insurance (UI) 
claimants. The first experiment was 
initiated by the Illinois Employment 
Security Department and was designed 
with the assistance of the W.E. Upjohn 
Institute for Employment Research. It 
yielded encouraging results, which led the 
U.S. Department of Labor to include a 
somewhat different bonus treatment in a 
New Jersey reemployment experiment.
Although the evidence from New 
Jersey was not positive, the Labor 
Department sponsored multi-treatment 
experiments in Pennsylvania and 
Washington in an attempt to refine the 
findings from Illinois. Funding for the 
Pennsylvania and Washington 
experiments came from money that 
Congress earmarked in 1987 to 
investigate methods for promoting 
reemployment of workers dislocated by 
structural change in the economy. Results 
from these experiments did not support 
the idea that the reemployment bonus 
could be a cost-effective way to promote 
rapid reemployment, and policy 
momentum for this bonus idea faded.
In 1994 and 1995, new mechanisms 
for early identification of UI beneficiaries 
who are likely to have long jobless spells 
were implemented in all states as a result
of federal law. These mechanisms, called 
profiling models, are currently being used 
by states as a means to target early 
reemployment assistance to dislocated 
workers. They offer a natural means for 
also targeting reemployment bonus offers. 
This article summarizes recent research 
findings which suggest that such targeting 
may appreciably improve the cost- 
effectiveness of the bonus.
The Bonus Experiments
The first reemployment bonus 
experiment, conducted in Illinois during
1984-85, offered a $500 reemployment 
bonus to UI claimants for returning to 
work within 11 weeks and staying 
employed at least 4 months. The bonus 
reduced the duration of Ul-compensated 
unemployment by more than a week and 
saved much more in UI benefit payments 
than it cost for bonus payments and 
administration of the bonus offer 
(Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987).
The reemployment bonus offer in the
1985-86 New Jersey experiment also had 
a 4-month reemployment requirement, 
but it had a 12-week qualification period 
and a bonus amount which decreased as 
the duration of insured unemployment 
lengthened. The New Jersey experiment 
raised questions about the benefits to the
(continued on p. 3)
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From the Executive Director
One of the stated objectives of the 
Upjohn Institute is to "communicate new 
knowledge and scholarship effectively to 
a wide audience of policy makers, 
practitioners, and researchers." One of the 
ways we seek to accomplish this objective 
is through our publications program. In 
1946, the Institute issued its first 
. publication, entitled Apprenticeship and 
On-the-Job Training for Veterans, which 
explored effective ways to assimilate 
returning GIs into the workplace. To 
further its objective of disseminating 
important research findings, the Institute 
in 1978 established, and has since 
maintained, a program of publishing 
scholarly books.
We believe that this program has been 
effective and valuable in informing the 
targeted audience. In most instances, our 
books offer cutting-edge analysis of 
policy-relevant issues related to employ 
ment problems. Equally important, in our 
books we try to offer a single unbiased 
source of background information about 
the issues being explored. Many readers, 
including professional economists and 
policymakers, seek a reference that lays 
out the issues, reviews what is known 
from the research literature, and then 
expands the envelope of knowledge in a 
form that is self-contained and accessible. 
The compliment I appreciate hearing the 
most is when someone tells me that they 
first turn to Upjohn Institute books as that 
single source of objective information 
about a specific employment program or 
policy issue.
The Institute's Publications Program
Over the years, Institute books have 
explored the gamut of employment issues, 
from the definitive two-volume treatment 
of unemployment insurance, to the 
productivity effects of employee profit- 
sharing, to workplace training, access to 
health care, and international com 
parisons of job training programs. We 
have devoted several books to disability
issues, including edited volumes from 
conferences sponsored by the National 
Academy of Social Insurance and by the 
Social Security Administration and the 
National Institute of Disability and 
Rehabilitation Research. With schooling 
and welfare adding the word "work" to 
their program descriptions (school-to- 
work, welfare-to-work), the Institute has 
published several books on recent welfare 
reform initiatives and on educational 
issues such as the effect of teacher pay on 
teacher effectiveness and the role of 
teachers, other staff, and school resources 
on educational achievement. In addition, 
consistent favorites among our readers are 
books on labor-management relations.
Most books published by the Institute 
originate from our external Grant 
Program or from our internal staff. 
However, for several years we have also 
frequently published books whose authors 
are not otherwise connected with the 
Institute. These volumes have originated 
in various ways; from specific author 
proposals, from conference proceedings, 
or sometimes from sponsored research 
without a publications outlet. Authors are 
increasingly sending us unsolicited 
manuscripts or detailed book outlines for 
consideration. Among the recent 
publications of this type are Lessons for 
Welfare Reform by O'Neill and O'Neill; 
Labor Law, Industrial Relations and 
Employee Choice by Block, Beck, and 
Kruger; and the volume of essays 
assembled by Garth and Stephen 
Mangum in honor of Sar Levitan entitled 
Of Heart and Mind. Such volumes have 
significantly enhanced the publications 
offerings of the Institute.
Expanding the Program
Now we are formalizing and 
expanding this external program, and we 
invite submission of publishable book- 
length works or proposals for books from 
outside scholars and policy analysts. 
Manuscripts and proposals will be
reviewed by Institute staff, and 
manuscripts will receive external, 
anonymous peer review if they appear to 
fit our interests. Authors will receive an 
assessment of their submission by the 
publications staff of the Upjohn Institute 
within four months. Assuming the project 
is of mutual interest, the authors and the 
Institute will sign a contract assigning 
royalties and rights to the work. The book 
would then be published, promoted, and 
distributed by the Upjohn Institute. We 
will also consider co-publishing 
arrangements where that seems mutually 
advantageous.
We believe that expanding this 
program is an important investment in the 
future of sound, useful, policy-relevant 
research. We hope to continue to hear our 
readers say that Upjohn Institute books 
are their primary source of objective 
information about employment policy
issues.
Randall W. Eberts
The Institute is interested in publishing 
books in these areas:
  Causes and consequences of unem 
ployment
  Compensation: earnings and benefits
  Economic development of local labor 
markets
  Family labor issues
  Labor-management relations
  Social insurance and income mainte 
nance programs
  Work arrangements
  Workforce quality: education and 
training
See our Web site (at www.upjohninst.org/ 
research.html) for descriptions of these 
areas.
Please submit manuscripts or proposals to
H. Allan Hunt
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
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Profiling for Reemployment Bonus Offers
(Continued from page J)
UI system from such a bonus offer 
(Corson et al. 1989).
The states of Pennsylvania and 
Washington each conducted separate 
reemployment bonus experiments in 
1988-89 involving a total of 11 different 
treatments (Table 1). These treatments 
were intended to supplement the 
information from the Illinois experiment 
by identifying which bonus amount and 
qualification period was most effective. 
Among the five treatments in 
Pennsylvania and six treatments in
Washington, only four were cost-effective 
from the perspective of the UI system 
(Decker and O'Leary 1995).
How Profiling Works
Profiling now operates in all states as 
part of the Worker Profiling and 
Reemployment Services (WPRS) system 
and is a two-step process. The first step 
excludes UI claimants expecting recall by 
their previous employer and those who are 
members of full-referral union hiring 
halls. In the second step, those who are 
most likely to exhaust UI benefits are 
identified. Almost all states perform the
second step using a statistical model that 
predicts the probability of benefit 
exhaustion.
In statistical profiling models, the 
factors used to help predict exhaustion 
usually include education, job tenure, 
change in employment in the prior 
industry and occupation, and the local 
unemployment rate. When workers open a 
new claim for UI benefits, their personal 
and labor market characteristics are 
entered into a profiling equation to predict 
their individual probability of exhausting 
benefits. State WPRS systems then 
quickly refer those with a high predicted
Table 1 Impacts on UI payments of Reemployment Bonus 
Offers with and without Profiling ($ paid per 
claimant)
Table 2 Net Benefits to the UI System of Reemployment 






































































































































*Statistically significant at the 90 percent level of confidence in a two-tailed test. 
^^Statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence in a two-tailed test.
Pennsylvania bonus amount: low = 3 X WBA (weekly benefit amount); high = 6 X WBA; declining = half the remaining UI 
entitlement, with the initial offer good for 2 weeks and then declining by 10 percent per week.
Pennsylvania qualification period: short = 6 weeks; long =12 weeks.
Washington bonus amount: low = 2 X WBA; medium = 4 x WBA; high = 6 X WBA.
Washington qualification period: short = 0.2 X (potential UI duration) + 1 week; long = 0.4 x (potential UI duration) + 1 week.
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probability to special reemployment '-_ 
assistance (Wandner 1997).
Profiling the Bonus
A recent study (O'Leary, Decker, and 
Wandner 1998) has investigated the 
effects of targeting reemployment bonus 
offers using profiling models and data 
from the Pennsylvania and Washington 
experiments. Simulations were performed 
using 1) the actual profiling models used 
in Pennsylvania and Washington since 
1994 and 2) new models for each state 
estimated on the control group data from 
the experiments using approximately the 
same prediction factors that are currently 
used by the states. Target groups were 
defined by varying the threshold for 
making a bonus offer between the 1 Oth 
and 90th percentile in the distribution of 
the predicted probability of benefit 
exhaustion, and the effect on bonus 
impacts for different target groups was 
computed.
The findings suggest that targeting a 
reemployment bonus to claimants with 
high exhaustion probabilities can yield 
larger reductions in UI payments than a 
riontargeted bonus, but that targeting does 
not guarantee larger reductions. 
Furthermore, the use of a higher 
probability threshold for targeting does 
not necessarily translate into larger UI 
reductions. Tables 1 and 2 summarize 
these results, which are based on profiling 
models estimated on data from the two 
experiments and were somewhat stronger 
than, but similar in magnitude and 
direction to, those estimated using the 
actual state models. In our estimates, the 
lower threshold (bonus offers to the top 
50 percent of beneficiaries, who are 
predicted as most likely to exhaust 
benefits) generally yielded larger impacts 
on payments than targeting bonus offers 
to the top 25 percent (Table 1). Hence, 
targeting with a modest probability 
threshold may maximize the impact of a 
bonus offer on UI payments.
Cost-effectiveness
Previous examination of net benefits 
for reemployment b.onus offers found 
more favorable results as the perspective 
broadened from the UI system, to all
government, to society as a whole. The 
net benefits to the UI system of a 
reemployment bonus offer are the 
reduction in UI benefit payments, minus 
the cost of bonus payments, minus any 
additional costs of administering the 
bonus. Untargeted bonus offers have 
generally not been found to be cost- 
effective from the crucial UI system 
perspective.
Some bonus designs appear to 
consistently yield positive net benefits 
when targeted to the 50 percent group; in 
particular, the targeted, long-qualification- 
period offers in Pennsylvania are all 
estimated to be cost-effective (Table 2). 
For Washington, the treatment with the 
strongest cost-effective results also had a 
long qualification period.
Targeting bonus offers to the top 25 
percent most likely to exhaust benefits 
yielded the same general pattern of 
results. However, narrowing the targeted 
group reduces the statistical significance 
of impact estimates because sample sizes 
decline. Such narrowing also reduces the 
net savings on UI payments in four out of 
five Pennsylvania treatments and in half 
of the Washington treatments.
A reemployment bonus targeted to UI 
claimants who are permanently separated 
from their prior employer and likely to 
exhaust their benefits is practical as a 
cost-effective early intervention to 
promote reemployment. Results from the 
Pennsylvania and Washington 
experiments suggest that a low bonus 
amount combined with a long 
qualification period targeted to the 50 
percent most likely to exhaust UI benefits 
is the best policy option.
Caveats
Targeting with profiling models 
improves the appeal of the reemployment 
bonus program. However, two potential 
behavioral effects might reduce cost- 
effectiveness in an operational program 
(Meyer 1996). First, an actual bonus 
program could have a displacement effect. 
Displacement occurs if UI claimants 
offered a bonus increase their rate of 
reemployment at the expense of other job 
seekers not offered a bonus. Second, there 
is the risk that a bonus program could
induce an entry effect; that is, the 
availability of a reemployment bonus 
might result in a larger proportion of 
unemployed job seekers filing for UI.
If the entry and displacement effects 
are sizeable, actual program cost- 
effectiveness will be lowered. However, 
since only some UI claimants would 
receive the bonus offer, targeting the 
offers by profiling would introduce 
uncertainty about the offer, thereby 
reducing the chance of a large entry 
effect. Targeting should also lower the 
potential for displacement by reducing the 
share of UI claimants offered a bonus.
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Jean Kimmel
Due to dramatic changes in family 
structure and female labor force 
participation, particularly the employment 
of mothers of young children, non- 
materna] care for young children has 
moved into the forefront of U.S. politics. 
The extent to which the government 
should intervene in work/family choices 
by subsidizing paid work through child 
care support is hotly debated. The 
motivation for intervention is strong, 
however, due to perceived problems faced 
by workers with children. In particular, 
low-income families typically must have 
two earners to be financially independent, 
and certainly most single mothers must 
work to remain independent from welfare. 
The fact that employment patterns of 
mothers with preschool children have 
changed so dramatically in the second 
half of the twentieth century might 
motivate a reconsideration of the 
allocation of responsibility between 
families and government. The dilemma 
facing policymakers, in the face of limited 
funding, is to provide assistance to those 
families most in need without judging 
their work choices or imposing too great a 
distortion on these choices.
The social interest in child care policy 
is twofold. First, there is a strong link 
between child care and employment for 
both married and single mothers. Because 
of declining real wages for lesser- 
educated workers, as well as changes in 
social attitudes regarding female 
employment, mothers in two-parent 
families increasingly are likely to work 
for pay. Labor force attachment for single 
mothers is growing too, because of 
changing attitudes and welfare reform. 
The second social interest in child care 
policy comes from the relationship 
between child care and child 
development, and the latter's link to adult
outcomes such as employability, 
productivity, and criminal behavior.
Child Care and Employment
Because mothers in the United States 
are the primary caregivers for their 
children, when these mothers work for 
pay, they must arrange for the care of their 
children. Because quality care involves 
high labor costs, the cost of child care is 
relatively high and likely to remain so. 
This high cost is burdensome for middle- 
class families, but the most acute 
circumstances are those faced by the 
welfare-to-work population and the 
working poor. For these two groups 
(nearly identical in financial 
circumstances), child care expenses can 
be 25 percent or more of earnings, such a 
large percentage of the monthly budget 
that it truly is a barrier to employment.
Child care policy can influence female 
employment behavior directly via 
subsidies that reduce the effective child 
care price or indirectly through other 
measures that influence child care 
availability or quality. Kimmel (in press) 
shows that the child care price elasticity 
of employment for married mothers is 
-0.9; that is, a 10 percent increase in 
hourly child care prices causes a 9 percent 
decrease in the average probability of 
employment. For single mothers, this 
elasticity is -0.2, while for low-income 
white single mothers, the elasticity jumps 
to -1.4. To get a better picture of the 
importance of child care costs, 
simulations can be run to gauge the 
impact of hourly child care subsidies on 
employment. For low-income white 
single mothers, employment probabilities 
increase from about 30 to 50 percent with 
a 50 percent subsidy, and they more than 
double with either a full subsidy or a
mixed subsidy based on income (Kimmel 
1995).
There is a growing awareness of the 
link between the quality of the care an 
infant or toddler receives and the child's 
intellectual and social development 
(Barnett 1995). One problem in the 
market for preschool child care is that 
parents do not seem to be aware of what 
provider characteristics contribute to 
high-quality care, and even when they are 
aware, the dollar value they place on such 
quality care is insufficient to meet the 
costs of providing that care (Council of 
Economic Advisers 1997). How our 
school-aged children are cared for is also 
a quality issue. Many relatively young 
children (aged 6 to 12 years old) are left 
to fend for themselves after school. There 
is some evidence that significant 
improvements in the availability and 
quality of after-school care would reduce 
juvenile crime and other life-altering 
negative behaviors (Fight Crime: Invest in 
Kids 1988).
There are persistent shortages in the 
supply of infant care, off-hours care, and 
after-school care for school-aged 
children. These shortages will become 
more acute as welfare reform moves 
forward because of more stringent work 
requirements and the types of jobs that 
welfare recipients are likely to get. 
Another problem is that much child care 
is of poor quality, and poor-quality child 
care has the greatest negative impact on 
those children coming from already- 
challenged home environments (Cost, 
Quality, and Child Outcomes Study 
Teams 1995). Finally, there are equity, or 
distributional, concerns related to the high 
cost of child care, particularly for lower- 
income workers or those making the 
welfare-to-work transition.
Federal Policy and Legislation
In 1993, about $17.3 billion was spent 
by families on child care for children 
under 5 years of age (U.S. Census Bureau 
1995). In fiscal 1997, about $13.8 billion 
was spent by the federal government, 
largely in programs such as Head Start, 
the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit 
(or its counterpart, the Exclusion of 
Employer Contributions for Child Care
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Expenses, otherwise known as flexible 
spending accounts), and the Child Care 
and Development Fund (the new child 
care block grant to states). Clearly, the 
federal government is already heavily 
involved in the various markets that are 
responsible for the care of young 
children.
In January of this year, President 
Clinton proposed several new child care 
policy initiatives involving approximately 
$20 billion in new federal funds. A quick 
search of the Internet for congressional 
activity regarding child care reveals over 
50 proposals in the last year, although the 
most recent (spring 1998) Republican 
budget blueprint does not include any new 
child care spending. Because subsidizing 
child care affects the child care and 
employment choices that families make, 
politicians are wary of suggesting policies 
that seem to encourage nonmaternal care 
for young children; yet because so many 
mothers rely on nonmaternal care already, 
it is also politically smart to pay attention 
to these mothers' preferences for , 
affordable, high-quality child care. 
President Clinton's broad child care 
policy package includes most of the 
proposals suggested by individual 
members of Congress, addressing 
affordability for lower- or middle-class 
workers, availability, and quality. One 
additional proposal from the Republican 
side concerns support for stay-at-home 
mothers in two-parent families.
From distributional as well as 
efficiency standpoints, policies that 
address basic affordability concerns for 
the working poor and those making the 
welfare-to-work transition are most 
critical. Dollar for dollar, child care 
expenditures have the greatest impact on 
these groups and also may tend to impose 
the least distortion on work choices, given 
that paid work is necessary for most poor 
families. Of the current proposals under 
consideration, increases in funding for 
Head Start and the Child Care and 
Development Fund are the most well- 
targeted by these criteria. The 1996 
welfare reform legislation articulates a 
national attitude that there are merits to 
work beyond the paycheck. The likely 
intergenerational benefits accruing from
attachment to the mainstream economy 
are difficult to measure empirically but 
still form part of the basis of this new 
welfare policy. However, work for this 
group must first be possible, meaning that 
child care costs cannot exceed a welfare 
mother's paycheck after housing and food 
purchases. The GAO (1997) concluded 
that even before the latest major welfare 
reform, child care subsidies were 
insufficient to meet the demand for such 
support.
Affordability for the middle class is 
addressed with increased funding for the 
Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit. 
However, this credit (also available 
through employer flexible spending 
accounts) may be targeted too broadly, 
providing benefits for families having 
sufficient income to do without such 
support. The federal tax dollars could be 
better spent if targeted on more needy 
subpopulations like the working poor and 
the lower middle class. A move in this 
direction would be to make this credit 
refundable. As it exists currently, it is not 
broadly available to those who are the 
most financially needy, because the 
lowest income workers owe no federal 
taxes, particularly after recent increases in 
the Earned Income Tax Credit. Adding 
refundability to the Child and Dependent 
Care Tax Credit could be financed in part 
by phasing the credit out at higher income 
levels. The affordability issue that the 
Republican proposal addresses namely, 
the budget problems faced by families 
with a stay-at-home mother is 
addressed, although minimally, in the 
recently passed Child Tax Credit.
Legislation to provide funding to 
influence quality, such as the money 
allocated for quality in the new welfare 
reform bill and the proposals by Clinton, 
are good starts, although the expected 
outcomes from the specific programs 
proposed are unclear. Because some of 
the quality problems in this market arise 
from imperfect information, it would be 
useful for the federal government to 
implement a broad, national advertising 
campaign to help educate parents about 
quality child care and to direct them to 
already available resources that help them 
locate quality care.
Women and families face a 
complicated set of choices, each with its 
own opportunity costs, in trying to resolve 
the work/family dilemma. While any 
resolution involves largely personal 
choices, there is a role for government, 
particularly for the working poor, for both 
equity and efficiency reasons. As for the 
current child care policy proposals, 
probably the most encouraging aspect of 
them is that our elected officials seem to 
be taking seriously the concepts that child 
care is a critical factor influencing the 
work decisions of mothers and fathers and 
that nurturing our children both 
psychologically and intellectually has a 
strong influence on adult outcomes.
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Peter S. Fisher and Alan H. Peters 
University of Iowa
Fisher and Peters offer the first 
significant attempt to quantify 
economic development incentives 




on tax and nontax 
incentive policies 
across the 24 most 
industrialized 
states in the 
United States and 
a sample of 112 
cities from within 
those states. From this work they are 
able to reveal
  the extent to which incentive policies 
are concentrated in economically 
distressed localities
  the redistributive effects of state and 
local economic incentive programs
  whether states subsidize competition 
between municipalities
  whether high-incentive munici 
palities exist in high-incentive states
  what proportion of local incentive 
packages is discretionary and what 
proportion is entitlement 
(nondiscretionary)
  what types of firms are targeted with 
incentives, and what this says about 
the goals of incentive policy.
"Economic development researchers 
should consider this book a basic reference 
tool. Economic developers who want to 
know what the competition is doing should 
also find this book to be essential reading." 
Timothy J. Bartik, W.E. Upjohn Institute
305 pp. $29 cloth ISBN 0-88099-184-4 




  University of Georgia
David Macpherson
Florida State University
Employers typically view their 
investment in employees' pension 
programs as a way to provide 
retirement income for their workers. 
Economists, on the other hand, see 
private pensions playing a broader role 
in the workplace. Besides being a 
source-of retirement income, pensions 
also serve as a means of enhancing 
workplace productivity and lowering 
labor costs. Dorsey, Cornwell, and 
Macpherson explore the theoretical 
and empirical 
basis for the link 
between pensions 
and productivity 
and, in the 
process, offer a 
complete and up- 
to-date discussion 
on the produc 
tivity theory of 
pensions. 
They begin with a historical review 
of institutional private pension 
practices and government policies 
related to pensions, then follow with a 
discussion of employment models in 
which training and monitoring costs 
generate job-specific productivity 
gains. Next they review a number of 
empirical studies which test the 
pension-productivity hypothesis, and 
they present new estimates of 
productivity gains for firms sponsoring 
defined-benefit plans. The authors also 
present new empirical evidence which 
suggests a link between pension 
incentives and employee training.
148 pp. $23 cloth ISBN 0-88099-186-0 
$13 paper ISBN 0-88099-185-2 / 1998
Poverty and 
Inequality




In recent decades, as the economy 
grew, policymakers could count on a 
portion of this growth to "trickle 
down" to those living at or below the 
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